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Abstract. Alloy and TLA+ are two formal specification languages that
are increasingly popular due to their simplicity and flexibility, as well as
the effectiveness of their companion model checkers, the Alloy Analyzer
and TLC, respectively. Nonetheless, while TLA+ focuses on temporal
properties, Alloy is better suited to handle structural properties, requiring
ad hoc mechanisms to reason about temporal properties. Thus, both have
limitations in the specification and analysis of systems rich in both static
and dynamic properties. This paper explores the pros and cons of these
two frameworks when handling this class of systems through the step-by-
step modeling, specification and verification of an example.
1 Introduction
Software specification and analysis is crucial at early development phases since it
encourages the developer to reason about the system and its properties, promoting
the detection of design errors. This activity generally comprises the modeling of
the system’s acceptable states; the specification of the expected behavior of those
models; and the actual verification of those properties. Thus, when choosing a
specification framework, one must be aware of the class of models and properties
expressible in the specification language and manageable by the provided tools.
The modeling and specification stages require different levels of expressibility
from the specification language. Models are comprised by structural properties –
typically first-order logic predicates that specify when the system is considered
well-formed – and behavioral properties – typically action predicates that specify
how the system is allowed to evolve. The specification, in contrast, is usually
presented in a temporal logic. This study focuses precisely on systems rich in both
static and dynamic properties. A paradigmatic example of this class of systems
are distributed computing algorithms. Structural properties encode acceptable
network topologies and behavioral properties restrict the evolution of their state,
while specifications usually take the shape of safety and/or liveness properties.
Therefore, although a variety of specification frameworks has been proposed,
the most successful are characterized by two features: they provide a simple yet
expressive and flexible formal language – allowing the user to specify different
classes of systems and properties at different abstraction levels – and are accom-
panied by tools that automate their analysis – providing quick feedback regarding
the correctness of the specification.
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Alloy TLA+
Modeling Relational logic First-order logicActions + Fairness
Specification Relational logic Temporal logic
Verification Bounded model checker (Analyzer) Unbounded model checker (TLC)(+ Theorem prover (TLAPS))
Table 1: General comparison of the Alloy/TLA+ frameworks.
Alloy [6] is a lightweight formal specification language with an object-oriented
flavor, whose companion Analyzer provides support for bounded model checking.
Alloy’s underlying formalism is relational logic, first-order logic enhanced with the
transitive closure operation, that renders the definition of structural properties
extremely simple. Alloy is inherently static, thus the definition of dynamic
properties usually relies on well-known idioms that have emerged thanks to the
language’s flexibility. Yet, such ad hoc solutions are error-prone and force the
developer to be concerned with particularities of the idiom rather than with those
of the actual system. As a consequence, considerable research has been dedicated
to enhance Alloy with dynamic behavior [5,3,8,11,4]. The main drawback of
these approaches is that they compromise the flexibility that characterizes Alloy,
introducing syntactic extensions that force users into specific idioms.
In contrast, temporal model checkers focus on the analysis of dynamic systems.
Among the most successful formalisms is the temporal logic of actions (TLA) [7],
a variant of temporal logic that relies on the notion of action to model dynamism.
Actions are essentially predicates that relate two consecutive states, and can be
used to model the steps that allow the system to evolve. Specification proper-
ties are instead defined in a restricted temporal logic. The TLA+ specification
language is based in this formalism and is accompanied by a useful toolset that
includes TLC, a model checker that has proven effective on the verification of
complex systems. Although TLA+ does support first-order logic properties, these
are not the main focus of TLA+, giving rise to some limitations.
Both these frameworks are being increasingly adopted and have been suc-
cessful applied to complex systems (e.g. [1] and [9]). However, although their
popularity arose due to similar factors – powerful but simple languages associated
with effective and automated tools – their particularities, resumed in Table 1,
make them excel in the analysis of different classes of systems. A more in-depth
comparison would help the development of systems with rich static and dynamic
properties, the focus of this study. For instance, Alloy users could benefit from
TLC’s unbounded technique, while TLA+ users could benefit from Alloy’s flexi-
bility. As far as we are aware, no previous study systematically compared these
frameworks, so as a first step we explore the potential of embedding “dynamic”
Alloy models in TLA+ using a concrete example. Although concepts are explained
as needed, basic knowledge of the frameworks is expected from the reader.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
Alloy example that will be used throughout the paper and Section 3 its embedding
in TLA+ and our experience with TLC. Section 4 presents a comparison of the
Analyzer and TLC performance for this example which are discussed in Section 5.
2 An Alloy Specification: Hotel Room Locking System
The Hotel example used throughout this paper models a hotel room locking
system, initially presented by Jackson [6, p. 187]. This system is built on the
assumption that the key management system at the front desk of the hotel
is disconnected from the locking systems of the rooms. Doors unlock for the
currently registered key, unless a more recent one, issued by the front desk, is
detected, at which point older keys are rendered obsolete. Structural properties
restrict the state of the front desk and room locking systems, while behavioral
properties model how these evolve as guests check in and out. The specification
will test whether unauthorized room accesses can occur. This section explores an
Alloy model of this system, depicted in Fig. 1, similar to the original one apart
from styling changes. For a thorough presentation of Alloy see [6].
2.1 Structural and Behavioral Modeling
Structure In Alloy, the structure of a model is defined by signatures and their
fields. Each Hotel instance consists of a set of disposable keys, rooms and guests
(signatures Key, Room and Guest, respectively). Each room has a pool of keys
assigned to it (field keys), and keeps track of the last valid key that unlocked the
door (field current), which must belong to the pool. A front desk (signature FD)
keeps track of each room occupants (field occupant) and the last key delivered
for each room (field last).
Signature and field values can be further restricted by defining facts – con-
straints that must hold for every instance. In Hotel, fact DisjointKeys forces
each key to belong to the pool of a single room. Finally, in order to recognize
fresh keys, the locking systems and the front desk must agree on a keys order a
priori. In Alloy this can be abstracted by imposing a total order over Key atoms.
Fresh keys are retrieved by the nextKey function from the pool of available ones.
Behavior Since Alloy is inherently static, well-known idioms have been developed
to model system evolution. This example follows the local state idiom. Here, a
totally ordered signature Time is introduced whose elements denote instants in
time. Fields that should vary in time are appended with a Time element that
denotes its value in each moment. In Hotel fields current, last, occupant and
gkeys are expected to be variable. Although every signature is static, this is not
the case in general, which would require additional facts to manage the temporal
consistency of the fields.To access values in an instant t from Time, one simply
composes it with the expression, e.g., current.t.
Actions are specified as predicates between two explicit instants of time (and
parameters of the action). In Hotel the system evolves as guests check in and
out and unlock the room’s doors. When a guest checks in, the next key for the
chosen room is given, and the guest is added to the room’s occupants (predicate
Checkin). The room’s locking system is unaware of such assignment: only when
a more recent key than the currently known is used to unlock the door is the
system updated, rendering older keys obsolete (predicate Entry). Obviously, the
open util/ordering[Time] as to
open util/ordering[Key] as ko
sig Time {}
sig Key {}
sig Room {
keys: set Key,
current: keys one -> Time }
fact DisjointKeys {
keys in Room lone -> Key }
one sig FD {
last: (Room -> lone Key) -> Time,
occupant: (Room -> Guest) -> Time }
sig Guest {
gkeys: Key -> Time }
fun nextKey [k: Key, ks: set Key]: set Key {
min[k.nexts & ks] }
pred Init [t: Time] {
no Guest.gkeys.t
no FD.occupant.t
all r: Room | FD.last.t[r] = r.current.t }
pred Entry [t, t’: Time, g: Guest, r: Room, k: Key] {
k in g.gkeys.t
k = r.current.t or k = nextKey[r.current.t, r.keys]
r.current.t’ = k
all r: Room - r | r.current.t = r.current.t’
all g: Guest | g.gkeys.t = g.gkeys.t’
FD.last.t = FD.last.t’
FD.occupant.t = FD.occupant.t’ }
pred Checkout [t, t’: Time, g: Guest] {
some FD.occupant.t.g
FD.occupant.t’ = FD.occupant.t - Room -> g
FD.last.t = FD.last.t’
all r: Room | r.current.t = r.current.t’
all g: Guest | g.gkeys.t = g.gkeys.t’ }
pred Checkin [t, t’: Time, g: Guest, r: Room, k: Key] {
g.gkeys.t’ = g.gkeys.t + k
no FD.occupant.t[r]
FD.occupant.t’ = FD.occupant.t + r -> g
FD.last.t’ = FD.last.t ++ r -> k
k = nextKey[FD.last.t[r], r.keys]
all r: Room | r.current.t = r.current.t’
all g: Guest - g | g.gkeys.t = g.gkeys.t’ }
fact NoIntervening {
all t: Time, t’: t.next, t’’: t’.next, g: Guest, r: Room, k: Key |
Checkin[t, t’, g, r, k] implies (Entry[t’, t’’, g, r, k] or no t’’) }
fact Traces {
Init[first]
all t: Time, t’ : t.next | some g: Guest, r: Room, k: Key |
Entry[t, t’, g, r, k] or Checkin[t, t’, g, r, k] or Checkout[t, t’, g] }
assert NoBadEntry {
all t: Time, t’: t.next, r: Room, g: Guest, k: Key |
(Entry[t, t’, g, r, k] and some FD.occupant.t[r]) implies g in FD.occupant.t[r] }
check NoBadEntry for 3 but 30 Time
Fig. 1: Hotel room locking system under Alloy.
currently known key also unlocks the door. Checking out vacates the room but
allows the guest to keep the room key (predicate Checkout). To actually force
the system to behave according to these predicates, fact Traces forces an Init
predicate to hold in the first instant – all rooms are vacant and no keys are
assigned – and every succeeding state to be derived from the action predicates.
Now the Analyzer will only consider instances built from action application.
2.2 Specification and Verification
Specification The property that is expected to hold in Hotel is that a guest
enters a room only if it is one of its occupants, a safety property. The Analyzer
does not impose any restriction on the class of predicates that it is able to check.
In Hotel this was encoded as the NoBadEntry assertion – a property that is to
be checked by the Analyzer. Note how the temporal property must be explicitly
defined by universally quantifying over Time elements (which are bound to valid
evolution traces due to fact Traces).
Verification The Analyzer is instructed to check whether an assertion holds for a
specific scope of atoms through a check command – here defined for 3 elements
of each signature and a length trace 5. In this version of the model NoBadEntry
does not hold, thus the Analyzer quickly generates counter-examples, one of
which is depicted in Fig. 2 (atom names are abbreviated for readability purposes).
Since the Analyzer performs bounded model checking, the scope of Time imposes
a limit on the length of traces, which may lead to unpredictable behaviors. The
most obvious one is that counter-examples may not short traces: in Hotel, a
scope of less than 5 instants would not detect the inconsistency, leading the user
to a false sense of safety. A more subtle problem occurs when checking liveness
properties, where the finite trace may lead to the generation of false positives.
The turnaround is to simulate infinite traces by forcing a loop, disregarding non-
infinite traces [2,4]. These issues, allied to the need to explicit model dynamism,
greatly encumber the analysis of dynamic systems in Alloy.
Another particularity of Alloy is that total orders force the number of atoms
to be exactly that of the defined scope. Thus, the check command from Fig. 1
only considers models with exactly 5 Time atoms, rather than models with up
to 5 Time atoms. Since there is no guarantee that counter-examples occurring
in smaller traces will reappear in larger ones, the user must manually check the
system for increasing Time scopes. Alternatively, the user could define his own
notion of order that did not force exact scopes but this would have great impact
on the Analyzer’s performance, since the native operation is highly optimized.
The presented counter-example breaks NoBadEntry because, even though
guest g0 checks out of room r1 and then guest g1 checks in into it, the locking
system of r1 considers g0’s key k1 valid until g1 uses k2, rendering k1 obsolete.
A possible fix to the model is to assume that guests enter the room immediately
after checking in: g1 would immediately enter the room with k2, rendering k1
invalid. Such constraint is encoded as the NoIntervening fact. With this fact
the Analyzer no longer detects a counter-example for NoBadEntry.
(a) Initial state.
(b) Checkin[t,t’,g0,r1,k1]. (c) Checkout[t,t’,g0].
(d) Checkin[t,t’,g1,r1,k2]. (e) Entry[t,t’,g0,r1,k1].
Fig. 2: Alloy Analyzer counter-example for NoBadEntry.
3 A TLA+ Embedding
Like Alloy, TLA+ is an extremely expressive specification language where models
consist of arbitrary predicates. However, the TLC model checker is not able to
process arbitrary TLA+ models, imposing restrictions to the language [7, p. 230].
Thus, two classes of issues must be addressed throughout this embedding: first,
the mismatch between the Alloy and TLA+ languages; second, the additional
restrictions imposed by TLC for checking properties. This section thoroughly
explores a possible embedding of the hotel locking system in TLA+, depicted
in Fig. 3. This specification is TLC-compatible, and can be deployed under the
configuration1 presented in Fig. 4a. Although TLA+ concepts are presented as
required, the interested reader is redirected to [7] for an in-depth presentation.
3.1 Structural and Behavioral Modeling
Structure Alloy signatures and fields take the shape of module parameters in
TLA+, which can be either constant or variable. This differs from the object-
oriented flavor of Alloy, where fields must be associated with a parent signature.
As a consequence, current and occupant no longer need to belong to the
placeholder object FD, which is discarded in the TLA+ version.
The user could expect to represent the static components of the model (sets
Key, Room and Guest and relation keys) as constant parameters. However, to
1 The TLA tools are currently deployed as the TLA Toolbox, where the TLC parameters
are defined through the GUI rather than as a configuration file.
module Hotel
extends Naturals
constant KEY ,ROOM ,GUEST
assume KEY ∈ Nat
variable keys, current , last , occupant , gkeys,Room,Guest
Key ∆= 0 . . KEY − 1
TypeInv ∆= ∧ Room ∈ subset ROOM ∧Guest ∈ subset GUEST
∧ keys ∈ [Room → subset Key ] ∧ last ∈ [Room → Key ]
∧ current ∈ [Room → Key ] ∧ occupant ∈ [Room → subset Guest ]
∧ gkeys ∈ [Guest → subset Key ]
∧ ∀ r ∈ Room : current [r ] ∈ keys[r ]
∧ ∀ r1, r2 ∈ Room : (keys[r1] ∩ keys[r2]) 6= {} ⇒ r1 = r2
Init ∆= ∧ Room ∈ subset ROOM ∧Guest ∈ subset GUEST
∧ keys ∈ [Room → subset Key ] ∧ gkeys = [g ∈ Guest 7→ {}]
∧ current ∈ [Room → Key ] ∧ occupant = [r ∈ Room 7→ {}]
∧ ∀ r ∈ Room : current [r ] ∈ keys[r ]
∧ ∀ r1, r2 ∈ Room : (keys[r1] ∩ keys[r2]) 6= {} ⇒ r1 = r2
∧ last = current
vs ∆= 〈keys, current , last , occupant , gkeys,Guest ,Room〉
nextKey [k ∈ Key , ks ∈ subset Key ] ∆= {x ∈ ks : x > k ∧ (∀ y ∈ ks : y > k ⇒ x ≤ y)}
Entry(g , r , k) ∆= ∧ k ∈ gkeys[g ]
∧ (k = current [r ] ∨ {k} = nextKey [current [r ], keys[r ]])
∧ current ′ = [current except ! [r ] = k ]
∧ unchanged 〈keys, last , occupant , gkeys,Guest ,Room〉
Checkout(g) ∆= ∧ ∃ r ∈ Room : g ∈ occupant [r ]
∧ occupant ′ = [r ∈ domain occupant 7→ occupant [r ] \ {g}]
∧ unchanged 〈keys, last , current , gkeys,Guest ,Room〉
Checkin(g , r , k) ∆= ∧ occupant [r ] = {} ∧ {k} = nextKey [last [r ], keys[r ]]
∧ occupant ′ = [occupant except ! [r ] = {g}]
∧ gkeys ′ = [gkeys except ! [g ] = @ ∪ {k}]
∧ last ′ = [last except ! [r ] = k ]
∧ unchanged 〈keys, current ,Guest ,Room〉
Post(g , r , k) ∆= occupant [r ] = {g} ∧ k ∈ gkeys[g ] ∧ last [r ] = k ∧ current [r ] 6= k
Act ∆= ∃ g ∈ Guest : Checkout(g) ∨ ∃ r ∈ Room, k ∈ Key : Entry(g , r , k) ∨ Checkin(g , r , k)
NoIntervening ∆= ∀ g ∈ Guest , k ∈ Key , r ∈ Room : Post(g , r , k)⇒ Entry(g , r , k)
Spec ∆= Init ∧ 2[NoIntervening ∧Act ∧ TypeInv ]vs
NoBadEntry ∆= 2[∀ g ∈ Guest , r ∈ Room, k ∈ Key :
Entry(g , r , k) ∧ occupant [r ] 6= {} ⇒ g ∈ occupant [r ]]vs
Fig. 3: The TLA+ embedding of the hotel locking system.
SPECIFICATION Spec
PROPERTY NoBadEntry
CONSTANTS KEY = 4
GUEST = {g1,g2,g3,g4}
ROOM = {r1,r2,r3,r4}
(a) Configuration file. (b) Counter-example for NoBadEntry.
Fig. 4: TLC configuration and counter-example for Hotel.
deploy TLC, the user must assign a fixed value to constant parameters. This
differs from the behavior of static components in the Alloy version, leading to
unpredictable results: although fields like keys do not change over time, the
Analyzer explores the evolution of the system under every valid assignment to
those variables. A similar issue occurs with Room and Guest since the scope
for 3 only sets the maximum number of atoms per signature (unless the user
imposes an exact scope or a total order). Defining them as constant in TLA+ and
assigning them 3 elements in the TLC configuration would assign them exactly
those elements. This is problematic in Hotel because such configurations do not
generate counter-examples. The model forces at least one key to be assigned to
each room; the instance from Fig. 2 arises from the successive checking in of two
guests in the same room, requiring a universe with two extra keys: a distracted
user could specify Key = {1,2,3} and Room = {r1,r2,r3} and miss it.
To model the expected behavior, keys, Guest and Room are specified as
variable parameters, the last two being forced to be within constants GUEST and
ROOM denoting their universe. Their values are unchanged by the actions, so TLC
will assign them an arbitrary value in the initial state but preserve it throughout
the trace, simulating the semantics of the Alloy version.
TLA+ is untyped, but it is considered good practice to declare a type invariant
over the variable parameters that is expected to hold in every state [7]. These are
defined as state predicates – first-order logic formulas without temporal operators
– as TypeInv in Fig. 3. We opted to encode the variables corresponding to Alloy
fields as functions, because these are more manageable in TLA+ and the Hotel
model does not rely on relational operators. TLA+ does not support relational
operations, like the converse or transitive closure, natively, so converting other
Alloy models may not be as straightforward. Expression subset A denotes the
power-set of A, and is used to “type” many-valued functions. For simplicity, last
was implemented as a total function from rooms to keys (from Init and the
defined actions, it would be always defined for every room). Additional structural
constrains, like the fact that the keys assignments are disjoint and that the
current key is selected from these pools, are also defined in TypeInv.
Since constant parameters are bound in the TLC configuration, TLA+ instead
provides an assume keyword that should be used to restrict their values, which
do not affect the meaning of the model but instruct TLC to test whether the
assignments of the constant parameters are valid. The Key set should be totally
ordered and bound exactly, so a constant KEY, assumed to be a natural, sets
the number of keys available, from which predicate Key creates a range. The
nextKey function then relies on natural intervals to retrieve the next key.
Likewise Alloy, defining a predicate like TypeInv does not affect the model
by itself. Nonetheless, the expected role of type invariants in Alloy and TLA+
renders evident a difference in methodology. In TLA+, these are typically not
enforced, but instead used to check the correctness of the defined actions [7, p. 26].
This reflects the prominent role of the actions in TLA+, that, along with the
initial state predicate, entail the set of acceptable states. In fact, TLC-compatible
actions must completely specify the succeeding states [7, p. 238]. In contrast,
actions in Alloy are defined by regular declarative predicates and do not by
themselves entail the set of valid states: type invariants imposed by facts may
restrict their result. This allows the user to separate the concerns between the
structural and behavioral components of the model, and obtain simpler action
definitions. In order to be as faithful to the Alloy model, TypeInv will be forced2.
Behavior A model in TLA+ is expected to follow the shape Init ∧2[Next ]v s ∧
Temporal , where Init is a state predicate restricting the initial state, Next restricts
valid evolution steps through actions – predicates with primed variables referring
to their value in the succeeding state – and Temporal is an additional temporal
restriction. Stuttering steps are intrinsic in TLA+, [Next ]v s denoting that either
Next holds or a stuttering step is performed with v ′ = v . TLC only supports
fairness restrictions in Temporal , which do not exist in Hotel.
Predicate Init follows the semantics of the corresponding Alloy predicate,
where occupant and gkeys are assumed to be empty, and last to have the
same value as current. As for keys, it is free to take any value that results in a
disjoint set, from which the current key is selected. Predicate Act is comprised
by the disjunction of the Entry, Checkin and Checkout actions. This is similar
to the Alloy approach, except that dynamism is now intrinsic to the language
through primed variables. TLA+ provides some syntactic sugar to define frame
conditions: an unchanged x expression is an abbreviation for x ′ = x and for
sequences or functions, an expression f ′ = [f except ![x ] = e] means that f
remains unchanged except for its value at x , which is updated to e (@ denotes
the previous f [x ] value). Although the model from Fig. 3 relies on these, it is not
clear whether they can be derived from an Alloy model. Predicate TypeInv is
also forced in every state by being introduced in Next . Alternatively it could be
2 We also tested Hotel in TLC with TypeInv set as an invariant, which proved that
the defined actions effectively preserve the type invariant.
set as a CONSTRAINT in the TLC configuration, which would ignore states where
it does not hold, but the model would not be self-contained.
In order to be TLC-compatible however, these predicates must follow some
stricter rules that bound the possible values of the parameters. For instance, when
a parameter is referenced its value must have already been bound by a previous
conjunct. Thus, in Init, expression ∀r ∈ Room : current [r ] ∈ keys[r ] cannot
occur before keys ∈ [Room → subset Key ] and current ∈ [Room → Key ], which
define the upper bounds of keys and current. TLC must also be able to derive
the value of every parameter in the succeeding state from Next . This contrasts
with the definition of actions in Alloy that are purely declarative predicates, which
may not bound the next state completely: either their outputs are restricted by
other facts or their behavior is non-deterministic. Thus, it is not clear whether
TLC-compatible actions can be derived from Alloy predicates. This hints again
at the central role of actions in TLA+ rather than structural properties.
3.2 Specification and Verification
Specification Unlike Alloy, TLA+ supports the specification of a subset of LTL
properties, supporting the always 2 and eventually 3 temporal quantifiers.
However, the class of formulas that TLC is able to check is limited [7, p. 236]: they
must either be state predicates P , invariant predicates 2P , box-action formulas
2[A]v s or simple temporal formulas, i.e., boolean combinations of temporal
state formulas (2P , 3P or 2(P⇒3Q)) and simple action formulas (expressions
23〈A〉v s , 32[A]v s and fairness predicates). This contrasts with Alloy where any
predicate supported by the language can be checked by the Analyzer. Thus, to
check the validity of NoBadEntry, the predicate must be converted into a valid
TLA+ formula that TLC is able to process. Luckily, NoBadEntry can be translated
into a TLC compatible TLA+ formula in a straightforward manner in the shape
of a box-action formula 2[A]v s, as defined in Fig. 3. TLC is instructed to check
properties through PROPERTY instructions in the configuration, as introduced in
Fig. 4a. Defining NoBadEntry as a box-action raises some issues related with
TLA+’s assumption of stuttering steps. When a guest enters the room for the
second time – i.e., when his key has already been registered – the Entry action
does not update the value of any variable. Thus, TLC will not recognize such
steps, identifying instead a stuttering step.
Verification By default, TLC will flag deadlocks as errors. The Hotel model is
however expected to enter deadlock for configurations without enough keys, and
due to the identification of Entry steps as stuttering steps as explained above,
deadlocks occur in every configuration. Thus, TLC must be instructed to ignore
deadlocks. As expected, TLC will then find a counter-example for NoBadEntry,
which is depicted in Fig. 4b.
To guarantee that NoBadEntry holds, the behavioral model must be further
restricted. Unfortunately, NoIntervening is not a valid formula in the TLA+
language because variables cannot be doubly primed. This renders the expres-
sion Entry[t’,t",g,r,k] not expressible in TLA+. Thus, NoIntervening was
adapted to force an Entry action to occur whenever there is a guest whose key is
not registered in the room, which is the post-condition of the Checkin action, as
defined by Post in Fig. 3. Such predicate is added to Next , forbidding invalid state
transitions. Likewise CONSTRAINT instructions, ACTION-CONSTRAINT instructions
could also have been used. Under this configuration, TLC does not find any
counter-example for NoBadEntry, as expected. One could wonder whether it
would not suffice to check NoIntervening ⇒ NoBadEntry . Unfortunately, this is
not a valid TLC specification, since it is not a simple temporal formula.
4 Evaluation
The Analyzer and TLC check properties through fundamentally different tech-
niques. The Analyzer embeds models into propositional formulas which are fed
to off-the-shelf SAT solvers. Thus, the procedure is oblivious of the model that
originated the formula. This also renders the process bounded, so temporal
properties may only be checked for traces with limited length. In contrast, TLC
interprets TLA+ models as finite state machines and deploys an explicit-state
model checker. Thus, it considers traces with unlimited length and has a finer
control on how the states are explored, enabling breadth-first searches.
This section compares the performance of the two approaches in the verifica-
tion of the Hotel model. All tests were performed multiple times on an 1,8 GHz
Intel Core i5 with 4 GB memory running OS X 10.10 with Alloy Analyzer 4.2 and
TLC 2.08. We are interested in assessing how the existence of counter-examples
affects their performance, so tests were run with and without the NoIntervening
constraint enforced. Although TLC’s default model is breadth-first (BF), it also
supports depth-first (DF) searches, which was also tested (for a maximum depth
of 100) since it could fare better when there are counter-examples to be found.
TLC was also instructed not to flag deadlocks as errors. The Analyzer was run
with the MiniSat solver, which our experiments show to be the most efficient.
The model was tested for different n sizes, denoting the number of keys and
the maximum number of guests and rooms. Besides being bounded, the total
ordering in Alloy forces the trace length to be fixed, so tests are run up to t in
order to find counter-examples with minimal trace length: the timing for a given
t aggregates the timing of the previous t − 1 runs. TLC’s breadth-first searches
naturally find such counter-examples. The check command from Fig. 1 and the
configuration from Fig. 4a represent the model for n = 4 (and t = 30 for Alloy).
Figures 5a and 5b compare the performance of the approaches for t = 30 (relevant
only for the Alloy results) and increasing size n. In general, although TLC fares
better for smaller n values, it is outperformed by the Analyzer for larger ones.
Interestingly, TLC is actually faster with NoIntervening enabled than without
it. Figures 5e and 5f compare instead the performance of the approaches for a
fixed n = 4 with increasing trace length t (the unbounded TLC results appear
as a constant function on t). As seen above, the Analyzer outperforms TLC for
such n values even at t = 30, e.g., the Analyzer detects the counter-example at
t = 5 in less than a second in contrast to TLC’s 415 seconds.
(a) Counter-example, t = 30. (b) NoIntervening, t = 30.
(c) Exact scope, counter-example, t = 30. (d) Exact scope, NoIntervening, t = 30.
(e) Counter-example, n = 4. (f) NoIntervening, n = 4.
Fig. 5: Hotel performance under different approaches.
Our experiments show that TLC spends a great deal of time generating every
initial state as a first step. For n = 3 and n = 4, there are 776 and 18960 distinct
initial states, respectively, arising from the attribution of values to Guest, Room,
keys and current. Even with NoIntervening disabled, although TLC detected
rather quickly that there is a counter-example, it spends considerable time trying
to reconstruct it from the trace, which also seems to be related to the number of
initial states. Interestingly, this also occurs in depth-first mode. In some contexts,
this procedure could pay off due to its ability to detect equivalent states. However,
in Hotel (and in fact, in problems with rich structural in general), state sharing
is limited since the free variable parameters in the initial state remain fixed as
the system evolves, not overlapping with other traces.
To compare the performance of the techniques in a scenario with less initial
states, we modeled a version of Hotel with exactly n Guest and Room elements
and n + 2 Key elements (the two scenarios do not have the same universe for
the same n value and thus are not directly comparable, but without extra keys
counter-examples would not occur). For n = 3 and n = 4 there are now 108
and 960 initial states, respectively. The results are presented in Figs. 5c and 5d.
Results show that although TLC is still outperformed by the Analyzer.
To overcome TLC’s generation of initial states we explore a different approach,
where the Analyzer is used to generate them, and then TLC is deployed over
each fixed initial state. This way the weight of solving rich structural constraints
is shifted to the more efficient Alloy, while TLC analyzes only the temporal
properties as it is designed to do. Moreover, the problem can be partitioned into
as many problems as there are initial states, avoiding executions running out
of memory. The trade-off is that counter-examples will no longer be guaranteed
to have minimal trace lengths since initial states are generated in an arbitrary
order. Also, TLC will no longer be able to benefit from state sharing. An Alloy
model that generates such initial states can be derived from the dynamic one by
removing every constraint that refers to instants of time other than the first, and
then, removing every reference to the Time signature (adapting the multiplicities
of the fields accordingly). An additional benefit is that Alloy’s symmetry breaking
greatly reduces the number of generated states – from 18960 to 520 for n = 4,
which are generated in less than 2 seconds (with symmetry breaking disabled, it
produces the 18960 states). TLC also allows the definition of the model elements
as symmetric, but in Hotel this does not seem to affect the number of states.
For a preliminary study, we timed the generation of these initial states by
Alloy and the execution of TLC and the Analyzer for a set of fixed initial states.
The performance of this technique when there are counter-examples to be found
is dependent on how many initial lead to a the counter-example. We calculated
this ratio and the times with NoIntervening disabled consider only considered a
portion of the initial states. With NoIntervening enforced, all initial states were
considered. The results regarding this two-phased technique are presented under
“TLC En” in and “Alloy En” in Fig. 5. TLC with fixed initial states seems to
outperform regular TLC executions, in some cases quite significantly, although its
gains over pure Alloy are not so evident. Alloy with fixed initial states fares worse
than all the other techniques, which is expected since Alloy has poor support for
partial instances.
5 Discussion and Future Work
Throughout this paper some pros and cons of using Alloy and TLA+ to specify
systems with rich static and dynamic properties were identified. Alloy has two
main limitations: first, dynamism must be explicitly modeled by the user, which
is a cumbersome and error-prone task, even if following well-known idioms;
second, the Analyzer only supports bounded model checking, which hinders the
sound verification of temporal properties. The fact that properties are verified for
exact trace lengths renders this process even more cumbersome. Alloy’s major
advantage lies in its expressiveness, fully supported by the Analyzer, in contrast
to the restrictions imposed by TLC over TLA+ models. This is patent in the
definition of the initial state and the action predicates, which in Alloy may
be purely declarative predicates but that must completely specify the state in
TLA+ to be processed by TLC. The properties that TLC is able to verify are
also restricted. The explicit dynamism in Alloy actually ends up being more
expressive than TLA+, as the free use of doubly primed variables demonstrate.
Finally, the management of non-variable arbitrary artifacts, common in problems
with rich structural properties are better manageable in Alloy than in TLA+,
where constants must be assigned exact values.
Regarding the possible embedding of Alloy models and specifications into
TLA+, some mismatches have been identified that would hinder this process.
First, the translation of predicates rich in relational operators would not be
straight-forward. This would be especially problematic with transitive closure
operations, that must be converted to recursive definitions in TLA+. Second, it
is not clear whether deriving TLC compatible models (initial state and action
predicates) and specifications to be verified from arbitrary Alloy predicates would
be possible. It is also not clear how enforcing stuttering steps in TLA+ would
affect the semantics of actions derived from Alloy.
As for performance, the Analyzer seems to outperform TLC with larger
scopes, but with the obvious caveat of the bounded search space. Feeding TLA+
initial states generated by Alloy showed promising results, but would depend on
an effective translation between the two languages. We expect to explore such
technique in the future, namely by relying directly on Alloy’s underlying model
checker Kodkod [10], which has native support for partial instances.
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